

303

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation at Luncheon Wednesday, 23 January 1952

PRESENT: Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State, Fisher Howe, Deputy to Mr. Armstrong, James Rober, AD/IC, and Loftus Becker, DDCI

The purpose of this informal discussion was to outline a number of points which might be the subject of further discussion, clarification and ultimately resolution as between the State Intelligence Organization and CIA. It was recognized that all discussions were of a preliminary nature.

The first issue raised was with respect to the interchange of highly sensitive material as between the State Intelligence Board and CIA. Mr. Armstrong raised the following points and Mr. Berlin commented thereon as indicated below:

1. Mr. Armstrong indicated that State had furnished
with memoranda covering meetings between the President and Mr.
Churchill and others, as reported by the State representative.

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He stated that CIA was aware of the value of such information and would be alert to recommend to the Director that anything of value to State be passed to Mr. Arms. In this connection Mr. Becker cited several recent items of the nature which had been passed directly to Mr. Armstrong by authority of the Director.

2. Mr. Armstrong expressed satisfaction at receiving the
so-called [redacted] and stated that they would be extremely
happy to receive anything comparable thereto which came to CIA.
Mr. Becker indicated that although such matters would have to be
considered on an ad hoc basis, he had no doubt that we would be
able to satisfy State's desires in that respect. If there had
been any failure in this respect in the past, it was possibly due
to the fact that there was no single official in which all of the
Intelligence information was centered, as it now is in DDCI (other
than the Director, who was too busy to act as a disseminator of
Intelligence details), but that this situation should definitely

be improved. Mr. Becker stated that, so far as he was aware, no Intelligence offices individually recognized the need for such information on the part of State. We would be glad to facilitate a flow of intelligence for which State had a legitimate "need to know." This, he believed, was in complete accordance with the DCI's own views. It was the DCI himself who had undertaken to distribute

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3. There was a brief discussion of the handling of sensitive raw items, such as S/S cables. It was felt generally that although there would still be occasions—on the one hand, to urge the State operating offices to be somewhat more liberal in transmitting such material to CIA, and on the other, to insure that CIA handled such material with due regard for its sensitivity—this situation was well under control.

4. Mr. Armstrong also pointed out the value to his organization of operational information which, strictly speaking, was within the jurisdiction of DD/P. Mr. Becker indicated that although such matters would have to be determined in the final analysis by Mr. Wisner, he would be alert to identify Intelligence material for which Mr. Armstrong's office had a "need to know," and to act as a friendly advocate with Mr. Wisner on Mr. Armstrong's behalf, just as Mr. Armstrong was doing with respect to the Operating Offices of State, for the benefit of the CIA Intelligence Offices.

5. Mr. Armstrong then raised the question of a recent OME Intelligence Memorandum respecting Iran. As regards this memorandum, Mr. Armstrong expressed the view that it was almost completely political intelligence (which was the agreed province of State) and that it preceded by a short time a coordinated CIA view, and, indeed, differed rather substantially from what now appears to be the coordinated intelligence view as expressed in said OME. Mr. Becker stated that so far as he was aware, this particular Intelligence Memorandum had only been disseminated outside the CIA to the President and to State. The memorandum had been given to the President by direction of the DCI and any question as to that dissemination would have to be raised by the Secretary with the Director. Mr. Becker had directed that no other dissemination be made outside CIA, but OME had reported that due to preexisting arrangements inadvertent dissemination had been made to State and Mr. Becker thought that this could only be helpful and approved it after the fact. Mr. Becker further indicated that the boundaries of political intelligence were somewhat vague and it would be impossible to draw any hard and fast line. Nevertheless, he

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Security Information

-3-

accepted entirely the principle that, so far as possible, an attempt should be made to coordinate important intelligence memoranda as well as estimates. In this respect, obviously he operated under the Director's orders.

6. Mr. Armstrong then turned to the possibility of co-ordinating "Current Intelligence" by which he intended to include all Intelligence Memoranda or documents other than raw intelligence information, on the one side, and RIBs and SIs, on the other. Both extremes seemed to be fairly well under control, but there was a certain lack of coordination with respect to this intermediate material. It was recognized by all parties that this portion of the discussion, in particular, was on an extremely tentative basis. During the course of this discussion it was agreed that there were time limitations on the production of Current Intelligence which, in certain instances, might preclude coordination. Mr. Becker further pointed out that aside from time limitations, one essential to the coordination of Current Intelligence as thus defined would be a recognition on the part of working level personnel in all departments and agencies that other departments and agencies were competent within their fields of specialization. This did not mean that there could not be inquiry as to the basis for a particular fact or conclusion, but that the value of coordination would have to be recognized by all and a healthy respect given to the views and ideas of those in other agencies. He had been particularly impressed that this was the principle upon which the IAC itself operated, and very substantial progress had been made by that body. It would be his objective in CIA to instill a similar point of view in all of the working level people and he felt that each of the other intelligence agencies would have to make a similar effort. It was agreed that this subject could well be a topic for further discussion and exploration.

7. Following the luncheon, there was a brief interchange of views on the different ways in which State and CIA handled special intelligence. State proceeded on the theory of separation, whereas CIA had adopted the principle of all source intelligence. Mr. Armstrong indicated that he was having a study made of this subject by Mr. Polyzoides and that he hoped that this study would be an objective review of the situation, covering both substantive and security implications. Mr. Becker expressed great interest in seeing this study. Mr. Armstrong also inquired whether the Charter of the Brownell Committee was broad enough to cover this subject and Mr. Becker replied that although technically the Charter of the Committee

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Security Information

TOP SECRET
Security Information

-4-

was not broad enough to cover the [redacted] situation, he would be most disinclined to raise any jurisdictional objection to having the Committee consider any subject which even remotely bore upon the matter it was engaged in studying. He felt that the work upon which the Committee was engaged was one of the most important development now under way and regarded it as most important that every relevant aspect be considered, since that would be essential to real acceptance of the Committee's Report by all concerned.

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It was the general consensus of the group that the meeting had been most helpful and that an attempt would be made to have future meetings at relatively regular intervals.

LOFTUS E. BECKER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE

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